Does China risk losing it all as it plays both sides in Myanmar’s lengthy civil war? – Technologist

Unlike its recent efforts to facilitate peace in the Middle East and in Ukraine, where China’s limited involvement was largely “strategic and long-term”, Beijing’s push for reconciliation talks in Myanmar is clearly driven by acute security concerns, according to observers.

Yun Sun, the director of the China Programme and co-director of the East Asia Programme at the Stimson Centre in Washington, said Beijing’s stepped-up role in Myanmar stemmed largely from the rebel takeover this month of Lashio, capital of the China-adjacent border state of Shan, marking one of the biggest victories for the anti-junta forces since the coup.

“[It] is a watershed event that will lead to more conflict. China has more influence on both the military and the rebels than any other country, or any other conflict, so China is in a strong position to mediate,” she said. “The question is how.”

China has been pushing both sides for talks to end the hostilities near its border, according to local media reports, with the junta and the rebels said to have reached a ceasefire in January after meeting in Kunming, capital of China’s southwestern Yunnan province bordering Myanmar.

Wang’s visit, followed by a trip to Thailand for a regional meeting with Mekong River states, followed Chinese special envoy Deng Xijun’s meeting with the Myanmar junta boss in Naypyidaw two weeks ago, and the arrival of Beijing’s new ambassador Ma Jia last week.

In Beijing on Tuesday, Wang met Julie Bishop, the special envoy of the UN secretary-general on Myanmar. China supported the UN in playing a constructive role in the political settlement of the Myanmar issue, he told Bishop, whose visit came at China’s invitation.

Sun said that China’s recent moves, and Wang’s trip to Myanmar in particular, were apparently aimed at “stabilisation and demonstrating China’s support for stability and for elections, which China sees as a way out”.

However, “peace will not be easy to achieve, especially given the military’s refusal to compromise”, she cautioned.

China’s interests in its southern neighbour, which shares a land border of over 2,000km (1,243 miles), are not limited to economic projects – Beijing has provided a lifeline for Myanmar’s military since the late 1980s.

Amara Thiha, a Myanmar researcher at the Peace Research Institute Oslo, said China’s main focus was the protection of its investment projects in Myanmar, many of which were located in conflict-affected areas.

“China has mechanisms in place for protecting investments in conflict zones, however Myanmar presents unique challenges due to its proximity to the Chinese border,” he said.

What is at stake for China in Myanmar is not just its vast geoeconomic interests, but also its ties with the junta amid doubts and distrust about Beijing’s interference, according to Yin Yihang, a fellow on Myanmar affairs at the Taihe Institute, a Beijing-based think tank.

“The current situation in Myanmar is rather critical and complicated, after the junta’s loss of Lashio, the headquarters of the northeastern military command, posing a major challenge to the momentum of the military and the legitimacy of its government,” Yin said.

Following his visit to Myanmar, Wang, who is China’s foreign minister and President Xi Jinping’s top foreign policy adviser, called the situation there “a cause for concern”.

During their meeting in Naypyidaw on August 14, Wang and Min Aung Hlaing “exchanged views openly regarding … free and fair multiparty general elections”, according to the junta.

“As a friendly neighbour, China opposes chaos or conflict in Myanmar, opposes external forces interfering in Myanmar’s internal affairs, and opposes any remarks that attempt to sow discord in China-Myanmar relations or smear and vilify China,” Xinhua quoted Wang as saying.

In a message aimed at both sides of the conflict, Wang called for deepening cooperation to implement several Chinese-funded megaprojects that are under threat from the escalating conflict, notably the China-Myanmar economic corridor and an oil and gas pipeline project.

Jason Tower, a Myanmar expert at the United States Institute of Peace, said Wang’s statement on maintaining “effective operation” of the cross-border pipelines underlined Beijing’s mounting concerns about the junta’s ability to protect China’s interests and projects.

“Over the past year, the Myanmar army’s rapid collapse and repeated battlefield losses all along the geostrategic corridor along which the pipeline project runs have generated major security concerns for China,” Tower said.

The junta has lost more than 30,000 sq km (11,583 square miles) of territory along the vital trade corridor between China and Myanmar in just over a month between late June and early August, according to Tower.

Following the fall of Lashio, he said the balance of power between the rebels and the junta had “shifted significantly” in favour of the former, meaning that China now needed to rely much more on resistance actors to secure its interests and achieve stability.

“These developments have pushed China to get much more deeply involved in trying to influence the trajectory of the conflict, and to increase pressure on belligerent parties to keep China’s strategic interests out of the crossfire,” he said.

Vicky Bowman, director of Myanmar Centre for Responsible Business, said Chinese government-to-government investments in Myanmar had been more affected than investments from other countries because of their location in areas affected by the conflict.

“However, many of them, particularly proposed dam, port and transport infrastructure projects, were still only at feasibility study stages. They were already facing delays and challenges even before the coup, so there has been little real impact on operating assets other than the pipeline,” said Bowman, a former British diplomat who was based in Yangon till 2022.

Of far greater economic significance is the disruption to cross-border trade in agriculture, fisheries and natural resources from Myanmar and manufactured goods from China, according to Bowman.

“This has badly impacted the private sector in both countries,” she added.

Wang’s trip, however, “showered Min Aung Hlaing’s regime with legitimacy and sent strong signals to all of Myanmar’s resistance actors and to neighbouring countries that China continues to see his regime as the primary national authority,” Tower said.

Ahead of Wang’s visit, Beijing was visibly annoyed by Min Aung Hlaing’s public remarks, in which he accused unspecified “foreign” sources of arming rebel groups.

The junta chief “implied that Chinese interference had resulted in his army’s defeat … which he used to spark anti-China protests” targeting the Chinese-speaking rebel groups that were central to driving the junta out of Shan state, Tower said.

“Wang delivered yet another warning to the military regime not to stoke anti-China sentiment, and the official Chinese readout of the meeting stressed the need for Myanmar to provide security to its economic interests in the country, implying that the Chinese government is no longer confident in the Myanmar army’s ability to do so,” he added.

Thiha, at the Peace Research Institute Oslo, also noted that Beijing’s opposition to “external interference” was aimed at some rebel groups, such as the pro-democracy People’s Defence Force, which had close connections with the US and other Western countries.

“China perceives these developments as potential security threats along its border,” he said.

Soon after Wang’s visit, during a virtual meeting between US officials and Myanmar’s shadow National Unity Government, Washington voiced support for the pro-democracy opposition and promised to maintain pressure on the junta.

Thiha, who has experience easing dialogue in Myanmar, said: “China possesses the most significant leverage among all external stakeholders in Myanmar, both economically and politically. Its active engagements, particularly with northern groups and the current regime, underscore its influence.”

But Beijing’s much-touted economic leverage and influence and the prevailing perception in Myanmar regarding China’s ties with the Three Brotherhood Alliance of ethnic armed groups – may also hamper its efforts to present itself as a neutral facilitator of peace, he said.

11:59

After three years of civil war in Myanmar, what has been China’s role in the conflict?

After three years of civil war in Myanmar, what has been China’s role in the conflict?

China’s often-proclaimed stance of non-interference in other countries’ domestic affairs, a cardinal rule in its foreign policy, also limits its ability to advocate for structural changes as part of Myanmar’s peace process, like Western mediators often do, Thiha said.

Yin, from the Taihe Institute, also agreed that despite tensions between Beijing and the junta, it was unlikely that China would abandon the Myanmar military.

“No matter how bad the Myanmar military is on the battlefield, solving Myanmar’s problems cannot be separated from the military – you can leave Min Aung Hlaing and other military leaders, but you can’t leave the military as a whole,” he said.

“China’s influence on ethnic armed groups is actually not that great. We asked them not to fight, but they didn’t listen. China is now in a situation where it is difficult to please both sides.”

Zachary Abuza, a Southeast Asia expert and professor at the National War College in Washington, agreed that Wang’s visit came at “a very sensitive time,” when the Myanmar military was “in terminal decline” while rebel groups controlled nearly the entire border with China.

“[China is,] no doubt, frustrated with the junta’s incompetence and battlefield losses that have undermined China’s economic interests,” he said.

Although Beijing deserved credit for investing time and effort and calling for a new ceasefire agreement, Abuza said that China had not yet accepted the ground truths, making their strategy “doomed to fail”.

“I am very sceptical of China’s mediation efforts. Beijing is still pushing for a nationwide election as an off-ramp for the junta. But this is a very naive policy,” Abuza said.

“It assumes that Min Aung Hlaing will agree to it, which is unlikely; he will continue to stall. It assumes that polls could be held, but the opposition controls over half the country and has no incentive to hold polls.”

But Beijing was expected to continue to play both sides in Myanmar by supporting the embattled junta, while arming the ethnic rebels at the same time to maintain some control and influence, he said.

“China desperately needs a political solution to the end of the civil war, or everything it has poured into the country is wasted.”

Additional reporting by Laura Zhou